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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)
V. )
)
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC., )
)
Defendant and Petitioner )
_________________ _________________________ )
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On March 31, 1990, Khalid Khawar filed an amended complaint 
for defamation against Globe International, Inc., Roundtable 
Publishing, publisher of a book entitled The Senator Must Die: 
The Murder of Robert F, Kennedy, and Robert Morrow, author of 
that book. (C.T. 141, 137.) The suit alleged that Defendants 
had defamed Mr. Khawar by accusing him of conspiring, in June of 
1968, to assassinate Robert F. Kennedy. (C.T. 138.) Mr. Khawar 
alleged that Globe published an article and accompanying 
photograph depicting Mr. Khawar as Senator Kennedy's assassin. 
(C.T. 139.) Globe's article, published in April, 1989, was 
predicated on Morrow's book. (C.T. 139.) Prior to trial, Mr. 
Khawar reached a settlement with Roundtable Publishing and a
1
default judgment was entered against Robert Morrow. See Khawar 
V. Globe Int'l. Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 14, 21 (1996) .
At trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Khawar and against 
Globe. (C.T. 2781-83.) The jury awarded Mr. Khawar punitive 
damages of $500,000 and compensatory damages of $675,000. (C.T.
2783, 91.) The judgment was entered on April 15, 1994. (C.T.
3110. )
Globe filed a timely notice of appeal. (C.T. 3130.) The 
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety, finding 
(1) Mr. Khawar was a private figure; (2) there was substantial 
evidence to support the jury's findings that Globe published the 
article with malice; (3) California had not adopted the neutral 
reportage privilege with respect to private figures; and (4) 
Globe was liable for defamation for republishing a defamatory 
statement. See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 14-15.
This Court granted review on September 25, 1996.
Statement of Facts
On June 4, 1968, Respondent Mr. Khawar, an amateur 
photojournalist for a Pakistani publication, was at the 
Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. (R.T. 1336.) Mr. Khawar was 
photographing Senator Kennedy, who had just won the California 
primary. (R.T. 2735.) When Senator Kennedy left the podium and 
proceeded to the pantry area of the Ambassador hotel, Mr. Khawar 
remained on the podium to reload his camera. (R.T. 2735, 1341.)
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A gunman in the pantry area assassinated Senator Kennedy while 
Mr. Khawar remained on the podium. (R.T. 2735.) Police 
prevented Mr. Khawar from entering the pantry area. (R.T.
1341.) A review of the investigations undertaken by the Los 
Angeles Police Department and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation provides no indication that Mr. Khawar was present 
in the pantry area at the time of the assassination. {R.T.
702 . )
In November, 1988, twenty years after the assassination of 
Senator Kennedy, Morrow authored a book entitled The Senator 
Must Die: The Murder of Robert F. Kennedy. (C.T. 138.) The 
book was published by Roundtable Publishing. (C.T. 138.) In 
the book. Morrow alleged that the Iranian Secret Police had 
conspired with the Mafia to assassinate Senator Kennedy. (C.T. 
143-73.) Morrow named Mr. Khawar (referred to as “Ali Ahmand" 
and "Khalid Iqbal" in the book) as the true assassin of Senator 
Kennedy. (C.T. 143-73; R.T. 1123.) Morrow's book included 
pictures of Mr. Khawar standing near Senator Kennedy on the 
night of the assassination. (C.T. 143-73.)
In April of 1989, a former employee of Mr. Khawar told him 
that he had seen Mr. Khawar's picture in a magazine. (R.T. 
1357.) Mr. Khawar subsequently discovered that on April 4,
1989, Globe had published an article with the heading "Former 
CIA agent claims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA."
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit B.) An enhanced photograph of Mr. Khawar 
accompanied the article. (Plaintiff's Exhibit B.) A 
superimposed arrow pointed to Mr. Khawar, identifying him as the 
Iranian agent who had used a gun disguised to look like a camera 
to assassinate Senator Kennedy. (Plaintiff's Exhibit B.) Mr. 
Khawar ignored the article and its accusations, hoping it would 
be forgotten. (R.T. 1355, 1362.) Subsequently, however, Mr. 
Khawar received several threatening phone calls and his property 
was vandalized. (R.T. 1367.) In order to clear his name, Mr. 
Khawar filed this suit. (R.T. 1368.)
A
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the court of appeal correctly decided that Mr. 
Khawar is a private figure because his mere association 
with Senator Kennedy's assassination is insufficient to 
elevate him to the status of a public figure.
2. Whether the jury's finding of actual malice is supported by 
substantial evidence that justifies the punitive damage 
award in Mr. Khawar's favor.
3. Whether this Court should reject the neutral reportage 
privilege, a defense not recognized by the Supreme 
Court, in order to preserve the integrity of individual 
privacy rights under the First Amendment.
5
ISUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I The court below correctly held that Mr. Khawar is neither a
general, limited purpose, nor involuntary public figure. Mr. 
Khawar's mere presence on the podium near Senator Kennedy on the 
night of the assassination is not sufficient to deprive Mr. 
Khawar of his status as a private individual. This Court should 
follow the rationale of the Supreme Court and find that Mr. 
Khawar did not become an involuntary public figure merely 
because the controversy surrounding Senator Kennedy's 
assassination is of public interest. Rather, this Court should 
affirm the holding of the lower court and find that Mr. Khawar 
is a private individual.
The jury's finding of actual malice is supported by 
substantial evidence in the record and justifies the punitive 
damage award in Mr. Khawar's favor. The record shows that 
Globe's editors possessed a subjective awareness of the probable 
falsity of the article, yet published it without regard for Mr. 
Khawar's reputation. Globe's failure to confirm the defamatory 
allegations made in the article, coupled with Globe's failure to 
substantiate its alterations to Morrow's book, supports the 
jury's finding of actual malice. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the award of punitive damages in Mr. Khawar's favor.
The neutral reportage privilege, argued for by Petitioner, 
should not be adopted in California. The privilege, which
I 6
focuses on the newsworthiness of a defamatory publication, 
rather than the status of the individual defamed, is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's defamation analysis. The 
privilege has been explicitly rejected because it ignores the 
delicate balance between societal and individual constitutional 
protections. Moreover, the privilege is contrary to public 
policy because it immunizes the media from liability for 
defaming innocent individuals. Even if this Court adopts the 
privilege, Globe cannot meet its burden of satisfying the four 
elements required to assert the privilege. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the lower court's holding and find that 
Globe is precluded from asserting a neutral reportage privilege 
defense.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEAL CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT MR. KHAWAR IS
NEITHER A GENERAL, LIMITED PURPOSE, NOR INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC
FIGURE.
The question of whether or not a person is a public figure 
involves constitutional principles of free speech and thus is a 
mixed question of law and fact. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). The issue must be reviewed ^ novo to 
ensure that constitutional principles have been properly 
applied. See id. at 285; see also, Bose v. Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Accordingly, the 
appropriate standard of review is whether, after an independent
7
review of the record, substantial evidence supports the lower 
court's decision. Weinqarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 
134-35 (1980).
This Court has observed that private individuals have less 
opportunity than public officials or public figures to
effectively counteract false statements. See Brown v_._Kelly
Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 744 (1989). As a result of 
this imbalance, private individuals are more vulnerable to 
injury. See id. Consequently, this Court has recognized that a 
"reasonable degree of protection for a private individual's 
reputation is essential to our system of ordered liberty." Jji. 
To preserve private individuals' privacy and reputation, it is 
essential that this Court enforce a high threshold for elevating 
private individuals to public figure status. In determining 
whether individuals are public figures, this Court should 
require evidence of "affirmative action by which purported 
public figures have thrust themselves into the forefront of 
particular public controversies." Reader's Digest Ass'n v. 
Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 255 (1984).
A. Mr. Khawar Is Not A General Or Limited Purpose Public 
Figure Because He Did Not Thrust Himself To The 
Forefront Of The Controversy.
Mr. Khawar is not a general public figure because he did
not achieve "such pervasive fame or notoriety that he [became] a
public figure for all purposes and in all contexts." Gertz v.
8
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). Persons who fall
into the category of general public figure have usually "assumed 
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society." Id. at 
345. "Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the 
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, 
an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all 
aspects of his life." Id. Mr. Khawar's very limited role in 
the events surrounding the assassination of Senator Kennedy 
simply does not elevate him to the status of a general public 
figure.
Mr. Khawar does not conform to the description of a 
limited purpose public figure. In determining whether an 
individual is either a general or a limited purpose public 
figure, a court should "look to the nature and extent of an 
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving 
rise to the defamation." Id. at 352. Limited purpose public 
figures are those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront 
of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved." Id. at 345. Mr. Khawar is 
not a limited purpose public figure because he did not take the 
requisite affirmative action. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the lower court finding that Mr. Khawar was a private 
individual, not a public figure.
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Petitioner argues that Mr. Khawar's mere act of standing 
near Senator Kennedy on the podium at the rally justifies 
labeling him a limited purpose public figure. The case law, 
however, does not support such an argument. An individual is 
not a public figure merely because he happens to be involved in 
a controversy that is newsworthy. See Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). In order to prove that a plaintiff 
achieved limited purpose public figure status, the defendant 
must show that the plaintiff voluntarily "thrust himself into 
the vortex of a public issue [and engaged] the public's 
attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 352. In this case, however, Mr. Khawar did not engage 
in the type of affirmative action required by Gertz.
Accordingly, this Court should not elevate Mr. Khawar to the 
status of a public figure.
In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court held that an 
attorney was not a public figure even though his representation 
of his client amounted to voluntary association with a public 
controversy. 418 U.S. at 352. To paraphrase the Court, Mr. 
Gertz was merely doing his job. See id. Similarly, Mr. Khawar, 
by attending the Kennedy rally, was simply doing his job. Mr. 
Khawar went to the rally because, as an amateur journalist for a 
Pakistani newspaper and a self-proclaimed student of American 
culture, he wanted to document the event. (R.T. 1336.) It is
10
true that Mr. Khawar positioned himself close to Senator Kennedy 
for optimum photo opportunities, but it would require a great 
leap for this Court to determine that this action alone 
constitutes the requisite "thrusting of oneself into the vortex 
of a public issue." As Mr. Khawar stood next to Senator Kennedy 
on the podium, he could not have predicted the assassination and 
the controversy that would follow.
Even if this Court were to accept that Mr. Khawar's minimal 
participation in the events surrounding Senator Kennedy's 
assassination elevated him to a limited purpose public figure, 
the passage of twenty years should negate that conclusion. By 
the time the Globe article was published in 1989, Mr. Khawar's 
image had likely faded from the memories of any individuals who 
might have recognized him as the "man in the yellow sweater" 
that day on the podium.
Moreover, Mr. Khawar's appearance on a local television 
show is not relevant to the determination of whether he is a 
limited purpose public figure because it occurred after the 
Globe article was published. The United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that "[t]he first remedy of any victim of 
defamation is self-help; that is, the use of available 
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation." Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 344. The Fourth Circuit has refused to "attribute
11
vindicate their reputations." Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., 37 F.3d 15^1, 1558 (4th Cir. 1994). The Foretich court 
followed the Gertz Court's advice to formulate "broad rules of 
general application" to accommodate the competing interests of 
press and personal reputation. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
343). The alternative, assessing each defendant on an ^ hoc 
basis, "would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain 
expectations." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. This Court should find 
that Mr. Khawar's decision to appear on local television news 
was a reasonable attempt to minimize the effects of Globe's 
widely-distributed attack on his reputation. Mr. Khawar's use 
of the shield of self-help should not be used as a sword against 
him.
Mr. Khawar's interaction with the press is distinguishable 
from that of the plaintiff in a leading case addressing the 
limited purpose public figure question. See Denney v. Lawrence, 
22 Cal. App. 4th 927 (1994). In Denney, the court held that the 
plaintiff, the brother of an accused murderer, was a limited 
purpose public figure because he gave interviews to the press in 
an attempt "to influence public opinion as to the circumstances 
surrounding the killing and his brother's culpability, if Any, 
for the homicide." Id. at 936. Unlike the plaintiff in Denney,
public figure status to otherwise private persons merely because
they responded to . . . accusations in a reasonable attempt to
12
however, Mr. Khawar made no attempts to influence public debate. 
* Mr. Khawar's only intent in appearing on the local television
show was to rebut the allegations in the article. Accordingly, 
this Court should find that Mr. Khawar's television appearance 
does not raise him to the level of a limited purpose public 
figure.
B- The United States Supreme Court Has Rejected The Idea
That A Private Individual Can Be Transformed Into A
^blic_Figure Simply By Involuntary Involvement In, Or
Association With, A Matter Of Public Interest.
This Court should not find Mr. Khawar to be an involuntary 
public figure because to do so would result in the resurrection 
of a standard emphatically rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971), the 
Supreme Court held that a private individual is transformed into 
a public figure whenever defamatory falsehoods concern matters 
of general or public interest. In the years since Rosenbloom, 
however, the Supreme Court has consistently repudiated this 
proposition. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 
U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (holding that a private individual is not 
automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming 
I involved in, or associated with, a matter that attracts public
attention); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (holding that the public or 
general interest test for determining the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to private defamation actions
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inadequately serves the competing values at stake) . This Court 
should follow the current reasoning of the Supreme Court and 
refuse to attribute involuntary public figure status to Mr. 
Khawar merely because the controversy surrounding the 
assassination of Senator Kennedy is of public interest.
In Wolston, for example, a publication referred to the 
plaintiff as a Soviet spy because he failed to respond to a 
grand jury subpoena in a Soviet spy investigation. 443 U.S. at 
159, 162, 166. The Court, in refusing to label the plaintiff a 
public figure, stated that "it would be more accurate to say 
that petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the controversy."
Id. at 166. To label Wolston a public figure, the Court 
reasoned, would reestablish the doctrine adopted in Rosenbloom 
and subsequently rejected in Gertz. See id. at 167. "A private 
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure 
just by becoming involved in a matter that attracts public 
attention." id. Therefore, this Court should not ascribe 
involuntary public figure status to Mr. Khawar simply because he 
became unwillingly involved in the controversy surrounding 
Senator Kennedy's assassination.
In Gertz, the Supreme Court made fleeting reference to the 
possible existence of involuntary public figures. 410 U.S. at 
345. The Court acknowledged, however, that while 
"hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a
14
public figure through no purposeful action of his own, . . . the 
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be 
exceedingly rare." Id. The Court did not indicate how an 
individual might become an involuntary public figure. Indeed, 
the Court has not to this date actually assigned the involuntary 
public figure label to any individual. Mr. Khawar's relatively 
minor involvement in the events surrounding the assassination of 
Senator Kennedy, coupled with the Supreme Court's apparent 
reluctance to assign involuntary public figure status, simply 
does not justify the conclusion that Mr. Khawar became one of 
the nebulous and rare involuntary public figures hinted at in 
Gertz■
II. THE JURY'S FINDING OF ACTUAL MALICE IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT JUSTIFIES THE
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IN MR. KHAWAR'S FAVOR.
Substantial evidence in the record supports a finding by a 
reasonable jury that Globe acted with actual malice. The jury 
found that Mr. Khawar proved by clear and convincing evidence 
that Globe published the defamatory article either knowing that 
the statements therein were false, or with reckless disregard 
for whether the statements were true or false. (C.T, 2782.) 
Based on its finding of actual malice, the jury awarded Mr. 
Khawar punitive damages in the amount of $500,000. (C.T. 2791.)
"The question .whether the evidence in the record ... is 
sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question
15
of law." Bose, 466 U.S, at 510-511. Therefore, this Court
should review all of the evidence on the issue of malice de 
novo.
In order to be eligible for punitive damages, both public 
figures and private individuals must satisfy the New York Times 
actual malice requirement. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, The 
Supreme Court has observed, however, that actual malice is a 
difficult concept to encompass in one infallible definition.
See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968). In New 
York Times, the Court defined actual malice as publication of a 
defamatory falsehood with "knowledge that it [is] false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it [is] false or not." 376 U.S. 
at 279-280. The Court has equated reckless disregard of the 
truth with a subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth of 
his publication." St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731. Another court 
held that "inaction, i.e., failure to investigate, which was a 
product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of 
facts that might confirm the probable falsity of charges will 
support a finding of actual malice." Antonovich v. Superior 
Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 1048 (1991).
As this Court recognized in Brown, private individuals have 
less opportunity than public figures and public officials to
16
effectively counteract false statements, and are more vulnerable
to injury. 48 Cal. 3d at 744. In order to effectively protect 
private individuals from such injury, this Court should follow 
the rationale of the court of appeal in Antonovich. This Court 
should find that Globe's failure to confirm the defamatory 
allegations made in the article, as well as Globe's failure to 
substantiate its alterations to Morrow's book, supports a 
finding of actual malice.
A. Globe Acted With Actual Malice Because Globe Had
Knowledge Of The Probable Falsity Of The Article And
Displayed A Reckless Disregard For The Truth.
This Court should follow the rationale of the Antonovich 
court and find that Globe acted with actual malice because 
Globe's deliberate decision not to investigate the defamatory 
allegations implies a subjective awareness of probable falsity. 
In Antonovich, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff, an 
unsuccessful political opponent, removed or destroyed files 
prior to vacating his office. 285 Cal. App. 3d at 1051. The 
plaintiff showed, however, that contrary to the allegations, the 
defendant was aware that the files remained even after the 
plaintiff vacated the office. See id. The court found that the 
defendant's failure to investigate suggested that he lacked a 
subjective good faith belief in the truth of his defamatory 
allegations. See id. Similarly, this Court should find that 
Globe's failure to investigate the veracity of the allegations
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contained in the article/ coupled with Globe s arbitrary 
modifications to Morrow's book, amounts to a deliberate decision 
not to confirm the probable falsity of the charges.
Like the defendant in Antonovich, Globe possessed an 
awareness of the probable falsity of the defamatory allegations, 
but made no attempt to investigate their veracity. John 
Blackburn, the author of the article, testified that he could 
not recall whether anybody from Globe questioned the basis of 
Morrow's allegations. (R.T. 1132.) John MeSweeney, an expert 
witness for Mr. Khawar, testified that acceptable standards of 
professional journalism dictate that when a news story makes 
controversial accusations against an individual, the newspaper 
must present a balanced story by providing the individual 
accused with an opportunity to respond. (R.T. 798.) According 
to Mr. MeSweeney, standards of professional journalism dictate 
that "any story as sloppy as this is and as unbalanced as this 
is and as vague about [its sources as this is] ..." should be 
discarded. (R.T. 795.) Indeed, Robert Blair Kaiser, a 
newspaper columnist, testified that Morrow's theory had "zero 
credibility." (R.T. 2152.) Mr. Kaiser stated: "It seemed he 
made the whole thing up . . . there was no evidence at all in 
the book, and there was [aj lot[] of evidence outside the book, 
from my own investigation, that Mr, Iqbal was never in the 
Ambassador pantry during the shooting." (R.T. 2152.) Moreover,
18
iGlobe's failure to investigate, despite the obvious bias and 
flimsy factual foundation reflected in the article, indicates a 
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that Globe's failure to 
investigate evidences a subjective awareness of the probable 
falsity of the charges.
Globe's failure to investigate is further illustrated by 
Blackburn's failure to make a good faith effort to contact Mr. 
Khawar. As discussed above, Globe should have made a good faith 
attempt to both verify the allegations and provide Mr. Khawar 
with an opportunity to respond. (R.T. 798.) Admittedly, there 
was some confusion surrounding Mr. Khawar's true name: in the 
Morrow book and the Globe article, Mr. Khawar is referred to as 
"Ali Ahmand" and "Khalid Iqbal." (R.T. 1123.) The index to the 
Morrow book identifies "Ali Ahmand" and "Khalid Iqbal" as being 
the same person. (R.T. 1123.) As the record shows, however, 
Blackburn could have located Mr. Khawar with only a few minutes 
of investigation. See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32. At 
trial, Blackburn testified that he "believed" he checked with 
Los Angeles Directory Assistance and was told that there was no 
"Ahmand" listing. (R.T. 1121.) Had Blackburn simply looked at 
the index to the Morrow book and asked Los Angeles Directory 
Assistance for an "Iqbal" listing, he would have reached a 
relative of Mr. Khawar who would have informed Blackburn that
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Khalid Iqbal and Khalid Khawar were one and the same. See 
Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32. Blackburn's failure to perform 
even these minor investigative steps falls far below acceptable 
standards of professional journalism. Thus, this Court should 
find that Globe's publication of this biased article implies a 
deliberate decision not to investigate facts that might confirm 
the falsity of the charges.
Moreover, Globe's reckless disregard for the truth is 
illustrated by Globe's modifications to Morrow's book. A Globe 
editor changed Morrow's job title from "CIA operative" in the 
reporter's copy of the article to "CIA agent" in the published 
news story. (R.T. 1091.) Mr. McSweeney testified that "calling 
somebody a former CIA agent has a lot more impact to it than CIA 
operative." (R.T. 809.) Globe's intentional publication of a 
fact it knew to be false emphasizes Globe's reckless disregard 
for the truth. Thus, this Court should find that Globe acted 
with actual malice.
Globe's claim that its sources were reliable is compromised 
by the inconsistencies in Blackburn's testimony. At trial, when 
asked whether he had interviewed three key sources listed in 
Morrow's book, Blackburn testified that he could not recall.
(R.T. 1140.) Each source testified that he was not contacted by 
anyone from Globe. Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32. In 
addition. Globe's apparent dissatisfaction with Morrow's
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pedigree (as a mere CIA operative) indicates a subjective lack 
of good faith in Morrow's credibility. This Court should find 
that Globe's failure to contact key sources and its willingness 
to falsify information indicates a reckless disregard for the 
truth.
The evidence in the record more than supports the jury's 
finding that Globe possessed actual malice. The foregoing facts 
emphasize Globe's awareness of the probable falsity of the 
allegations and Globe's subsequent decision not to acquire 
knowledge of facts that might confirm this falsity. Blackburn's 
failure to contact Mr. Khawar and other important sources 
indicates a failure to investigate. Globe's modification of 
Morrow's book signifies a reckless disregard for the truth and 
credibility of Globe's sources. These facts underscore Globe's 
deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of the facts that 
would reveal the falsity of the charges. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the findings of the court below and hold 
that the award of punitive damages was proper.
III. IN RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS, THIS COURT HAS
NOT ADOPTED, AND SHOULD NOT NOW ADOPT, THE NEUTRAL
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE.
The neutral reportage privilege was established as a 
defense to defamation liability by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. S^ Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'v, Inc., 556 F.2d 
113, 120 (1977). The privilege has not yet been recognized as a
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Whetherlegitimate defense by the United States Supreme Court 
such privilege exists or not is a question of first impression 
by this court, and should therefore be reviewed ^ novo. This 
Court "must make an independent examination of the whole record, 
so as to assure [itself] that the judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." New York 
Times. 376 U.S. at 205.
Under the neutral reportage privilege, reporters can 
republish fair and accurate reports of false, defamatory 
statements, regardless of the reporter's subjective awareness of 
the statements' falsity. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. In
Edwards, the court extended the First Amendment to the common 
law privilege of fair report.^ See id. The Edwards court 
provided constitutional immunity to reporters of information 
relevant to the public interest. See id. This decision, 
however, ignores the equally important policy that one should 
enjoy one's reputation, unimpaired by defamatory attacks. In 
recognition of this fundamental right to privacy, which Edwards 
failed to address, one Supreme Court justice noted that, "the 
right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from 
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
^ The common law privilege of fair report was established as a 
qualified protection for fair and accurate republishings of defamatory 
statements made in public governmental meetings or in judicial 
documents. See Rodney A, Nelson, Comment, Neutral Reportage: Making
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a 3
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, 
J., concurring).
The neutral reportage privilege has not been well received 
by the courts. See Ray Worthy Cambell, Note, The Developing 
Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 Va. L. Rev. 853, 863 (1983). 
Some courts have explicitly refused to adopt the privilege 
because its newsworthiness requirement conflicts with the 
Supreme Court's constitutional frameworlc for protecting freedom 
of expression in defamation cases.^ See id. This Court should 
therefore consider the Supreme Court's lilcely rejection of the 
neutral reportage privilege in reviewing whether or not to adopt 
the privilege in California.
The Newsworthy Requirement Of The Neutral Reportage
Privilege Is Inconsistent With The United States
Supreme Court's Focus On The Status Of The Individual
Defamed.
In the seminal New York Times decision, the Supreme Court 
first addressed the conflict between the public's interest in 
the free exchange of information and an individual's interest in 
being protected from defamation. 376 U.S. at 256. The Court
S^ense of Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'V/ Inc.^ 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 47i 
(1991).
For the leading federal case rejecting the neutral reportage 
rivilege based on the inconsistency of the newsworthy requirement 
ith the Supreme Court decisions in Gertz and St. Amant, see Diclcev v. 
CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3rd Cir., 1978).
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for freedom ofheld that in order to provide ''breathing space" 
expression, a public official must prove actual malice in order
to recover damages for defamation. See i^ at 279-80. The 
court focused on the status of the public official in order to 
determine if protection should have been granted under the First 
Amendment. id^ The Court's rationale in New York Times
thereby set the groundwork for affording constitutional 
protection to defamation defendants based upon an examination of
the plaintiff's status.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the Court 
has consistently focused on the plaintiff's status in deciding 
whether a defamatory publication is protected by the First 
Amendment. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-48; Firestone, 424 U.S, 
at 157; Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166-69. These cases repudiated a 
First Amendment protection standard based on a newsworthiness 
test. This Court should reject the neutral reportage privilege 
and follow the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis, focusing 
on the status of the individual defamed and not the
newsworthiness of the allegation.
In Gertz, the defendant wrote a defamatory article about an 
attorney who represented a police officer's family in a murder 
trial. 418 U.S. at 326. The Court rejected a subject matter 
(or newsworthiness) analysis because it failed to sufficiently 
protect the constitutional interest in a private person's
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reputation. See id. at 345-46, The Court thereby overruled its 
previous decision in Rosenbloom. See id. Moreover, the Court 
expressly refused to extend the actual malice requirement of New 
York Times to defamatory falsehoods involving private 
individuals, regardless of public interest in the subject 
matter. See id. The Court followed its reasoning established 
iri New York Times by reaffirming a status-based analysis and 
overruling its previous decision to apply a newsworthy test.
The Court subsequently reaffirmed Gertz and again renounced 
the subject matter test. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454. In 
Firestone, the plaintiff filed a defamation suit against Time, 
Inc. for inaccurately reporting on her divorce proceedings. Id. 
at 452. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the 
actual malice standard should apply because of the public's 
interest in a divorce characterized as "cause celebre." See id. 
at 454. The Court noted that it had repudiated the subject 
matter test in Gertz in favor of a test that focused on the 
plaintiff's status. See id. at 455-56.
In its most recent rejection of the newsworthiness test, 
the Court held that a private individual does not become a 
public figure merely by becoming associated with a newsworthy 
matter. S^ Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167. In Wolston, the 
plaintiff was incorrectly identified as a Soviet agent after 
failing to appear before a panel investigating Soviet spy
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activities. See id. at 159, 162. The Court rejected the 
defendant's argument that the plaintiff was a public figure who 
was required to prove that the defamation was made with actual 
malice. See id. at 165-68. The Court applied its rationale 
from Gert2 and held that "[a] libel defendant must show more 
than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding 
burden of New York Times." Id. at 167-68. Thus, consistent 
with its previous holdings, the Court once again rejected the 
subject matter test.
"The Supreme Court has established a constitutional 
framework for protecting freedom of expression in defamation 
cases in which the standard of protection applied is determined 
by the status of the person defamed." Dennis J. Dobbels,
Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A 
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should be 
Rejected, 33 Hastings L-J. 1203, 1218 (1982). This framework 
preserves the constitutional balance between the public s 
interest in freedom of expression and an individual's interest 
in protecting his or her reputation. In contrast, the Edwards 
test, which was established one year after the Supreme Court's 
explicit rejection of the newsworthiness standard in Firestone, 
fails to effectively weigh these competing interests because it 
only cursorily considers the status of the person defamed. This
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Court should follow the framework adopted by the Supreme Court 
I and decline to adopt the neutral reportage privilege,
B. The Neutral Reportage Privilege Is Inconsistent
With The California Constitution.
I The expansive immunity provided by the neutral reportage
privilege runs contrary to California's Constitution, which 
holds a person liable for irresponsible publication of 
defamatory statements. Following the Supreme Court's rationale, 
this Court should refuse to adopt the privilege because it fails 
to consider the delicate balance between societal and individual 
constitutional rights.
The California Constitution states that "[e]very person may 
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law 
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal, 
Const, art. I, § 2, subd. (a). Thus, California's Constitution 
recognizes the principles of the First Amendment, but expressly
provides constitutional protections for an individual'sI
reputation. See id. This constitutional protection, coupled 
with the necessity of imposing responsibility for the abuse of 
I the right of freedom of expression, should persuade this Court
to reject the adoption of the neutral reportage privilege in 
California.
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In Edwards^ the Second Circuit created a standard that 
immunizes a reporter from liability for defamation so long as 
the defamatory statements are newsworthy and affect the public 
welfare. 556 F.2d at 120. The Edwards court concluded that the 
public's interest in newsworthy information outweighs an 
individual's interest in his or her reputation. See Dobbels, 33 
Hastings L.J. at 1210. This analysis is not only inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court's First Amendment framework, but it is 
aj^so inconsistent with California's Constitution. Accordingly, 
this Court should reject adoption of the neutral reportage 
privilege.
The California Constitution, like the Supreme Court in 
Gertz, recognizes the importance of an individual's reputation, 
as well as the value in holding the media responsible for 
abusing the boundaries of freedom of expression. As this Court 
has observed, the California Constitution demands recognition of 
the value of an individual's reputation. See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d 
at 727 (citing Cal. Const, art. I, § 2, subd. (a)). The neutral 
reportage privilege only incidentally considers the 
differentiation between public and private individuals' 
reputations. Consequently, extending the privilege to all 
individuals without differentiating on the basis of status, 
would prevent any person from recovering for a defamatory 
statement republished by a media defendant, so long as the
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defamation was newsworthy. Adoption of the neutral reportage 
privilege in California would contradict this state's policy of 
protecting an individual's reputation, a tenet recognized by 
this Court in its previous holding in Brown.
C. Extension Of The Neutral Reportage Privilege To
Private Individuals Is Inconsistent With Existing
Public Policy.
The neutral reportage privilege should not be adopted in 
California. If this Court were to adopt the privilege, however, 
despite its shortcomings, this Court should find that the 
privilege only extends to publications concerning public 
figures. Accordingly, because Mr. Khawar is a private figure, 
this Court should find that the privilege is inapplicable in 
this case.
This Court has held that "a publication or broadcast 
by a member of the news media to the general public regarding a 
private person is not privileged." Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 727.
In Brown, this Court rejected the public interest privilege 
which provides immunity for publication of defamatory statements 
relevant to the public interest. See i^ at 756. This Court 
rejected the privilege because it granted overly-expansive 
constitutional protections to the media and placed unjustifiably 
severe limitations on private plaintiffs seeking recovery for 
defamation. See Id. at 721, 744 . Although in Brown this Court 
applied the public interest privilege, rather than the neutral
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reportage privilege, an analogy is appropriate because both 
doctrines seek to expand constitutional protections for the 
media. Like the public interest test rejected in Bro^,
Edwards' neutral reportage privilege undermines the 
constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights of private 
individuals and should likewise be rejected.
Moreover, as this Court has noted, "private individuals 
have less opportunity than public officials and public figures 
to effectively counteract false statements and are more 
vulnerable to injury." Id^ at 744. The Supreme Court has also
noted that private individuals have
relinquished no part of [their] interest in the protection 
of [their] own good name, and consequently [they have] a 
more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury 
inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private 
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than 
public officials and public figures; they are also more 
deserving of recovery.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Accordingly, to protect private 
individuals from injury, this Court should not adopt the neutral 
reportage privilege.
Significant social values fundamental to the law of 
defamation also support the preclusion of the neutral reportage 
privilege to private individuals. "Society has a pervasive and 
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon 
reputation." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. As Justice Stevens 
commented, "[t]he destruction that defamatory falsehood can
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bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to 
redeem. Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is 
the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man 
whose reputation has been falsely dishonored." Id. at 93-94. 
Eliminating the ability of victims of defamation to seek legal 
redress would be contrary to the spirit of the United States and 
California Constitutions. Accordingly, even if this Court 
adopts the neutral reportage privilege in California, public 
policy and the constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights of 
individuals should bar the extension of the privilege to private 
figures.
D. Even The Court That Created The Neutral
Reportage Privilege Has Noted That The Privilege
Should Be Narrowly Construed.
Subsequent to its ruling that public interest in newsworthy 
information may outweigh a private individual's right to an 
unsullied reputation, the Second Circuit revisited the neutral 
reportage issue and limited the scope of the protection it 
conferred. S^ Cianci v. New Times Publ'q Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 
(2d Cir. 1980). This Court, like the Second Circuit, should 
recognize the doctrinal uncertainty created by the neutral 
reportage privilege, and refuse to apply such an expansive media 
protection to this state.
In Cianci, the defendant reported that the mayor of 
Providence, Rhode Island had been accused of raping a woman who
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agreed to drop the charges following a $3,000 settlement. See 
id. at 56. Although the story did report that the mayor denied 
the charge, it did not contain his version of the facts. See 
id. at 69. The Second Circuit noted that "[w]hile the Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed the question of the existence of a 
constitutional privilege of neutral reportage, . . . this 
circuit is on record that the media enjoy such a privilege with 
respect to public officials or figures." Id. at 67, The court 
further noted that "the precise bounds of the privilege remain 
to be delineated." Id. at 69. The court then espoused a narrow 
construction of the privilege, stating that the Edwards opinion 
"did contain important suggestions that the privilege was 
limited in scope and required careful examination of the facts 
in each case." Id. at 68, The court agreed that the mayor was 
a public figure, but found that, unlike the defendant in 
Edwards, the magazine had failed to take a neutral stance on the 
allegations. See id. at 69. The court concluded, "[t]he need 
for the careful limitation of a constitutional privilege for 
fair reportage is demonstrated by the breadth of the defense, 
which confers immunity even for publishing statements believed 
to be untrue." id. Accordingly, this Court should not adopt a 
privilege that its creators believe to be limited in scope and 
application.
32
IV. EVEN IF THIS COURT ADOPTS THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE, IT IS NOT A DEFENSE FOR GLOBE'S CONDUCT IN THIS 
I CASE.
Four necessary elements must be demonstrated to establish 
the neutral reportage privilege as delineated in Edwards: (1}
the charges must be newsworthy and must create or be associated 
with a public controversy; (2) the charges must be made by a 
responsible and prominent source; (3) the charges must be 
reported neutrally and accurately; and (4) the charges must be 
made about a public official or public figure. See Edwards, 556 
F.2d at 120. Even if this Court adopts the neutral reportage 
privilege, Globe cannot meet this burden. Accordingly, this 
Court should deny Globe a neutral reportage privilege defense 
and find Globe liable for defamation against Mr. Khawar.
^• Globe Has Not Satisfied the Neutral Reportage
Privilege Requirement That The Allegations Against Mr.
Khawar Be Both Newsworthy And Associated With A Public
Controversy.
The neutral reportage privilege requires that the 
allegations made against a defamation plaintiff be newsworthy 
and be associated with a public controversy. See Edwards, 556 
F.2d at 120. The allegation that Mr. Khawar was part of a 
I completely unsubstantiated conspiracy to assassinate Senator
Kennedy is not newsworthy. John McSweeney, a forty year veteran 
of the news business, testified that he would not consider 
Morrow's theory to be newsworthy because the assassination
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(R.T, 868, 861,)occurred more than twenty years ago.
Furthermore, Globe published the article almost six months after 
Roundtable distributed Morrow's book. (C.T. 138-39.) If 
Morrow's theory were truly newsworthy, surely Globe would have 
published a report on it immediately, rather than waiting six 
months. Globe's delay suggests that it used the article as a 
filler. Moreover, "a constitutional privilege of neutral 
reportage is not created . . . merely because an individual
newspaper . . . decides that a particular statement is 
newsworthy." Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 
1978). Accordingly, this Court should find that the article 
fails to satisfy the first requirement of the neutral reportage 
privilege.
There is no existing public controversy surrounding Mr. 
Khawar's role in Senator Kennedy's assassination. Though a 
legitimate public controversy may arise if new evidence 
surfaces, the allegations made against Mr. Khawar were not 
substantiated by any evidence. (R.T. 2152.) One expert 
testified that his investigations led him to the conclusion that 
absolutely no evidence existed to support the allegations made 
against Mr. Khawar. (R.T. 2152.) Moreover, the assassination 
and the ensuing controversy occurred in 1963, more than twenty 
years prior to Globe's article. Additionally, a man named 
Sirhan Sirhan has been convicted of the assassination. The fact
that Mr. Khawar could not have been the true assassin is 
corroborated by Robert A. Houghton, the chief detective 
supervising the investigation of Senator Kennedy's 
assassination. Mr. Houghton testified that based on a video of 
the assassination, and on an analysis of Mr. Khawar's physical 
location surrounding the assassination, it is impossible that 
Mr. Khawar could have been in the area when and where Senator 
Kennedy was shot. (R.T. 950-56.) Accordingly, this Court 
should find that Globe did not print a newsworthy charge about 
an existing public controversy when it printed Morrow's theory.
B- Globe Has Not Satisfied The Neutral Reportage
Privilege Requirement That The Allegations Be Made By
A Responsible And Prominent Source.
The neutral reportage privilege requires that allegations 
made against a defamation plaintiff stem from a responsible and 
prominent source. S^ Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. Morrow should 
not be considered a prominent source. Robert Blair Kaiser, a 
columnist and author of a book chronicling the assassination of 
Senator Kennedy, testified that he was "incredulous" because he 
thought that Morrow was simply not "playing with a full deck" 
and had "zero credibility." (R.T. 2151-52.) Mr. Kaiser stated 
that Morrow had no real evidence to support his hypothesis that 
Mr. Khawar shot Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 2152.) Mr. Kaiser also 
testified that the evidence from his own investigation showed 
that Mr. Khawar was never in the pantry area during Senator
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1861.) Morrow irresponsibly charged Mr. Khawar with the 
assassination of Senator Kennedy/ despite a lack of evidence 
proving the allegations. Accordingly, this Court should find 
that unsubstantiated allegations directed at Mr. Khawar do not 
make Morrow a responsible source.
C. Globe Has Not Satisfied The Neutral Reporta^
Privilege Requirement That The Allegations Be Reported 
Neutrally And Accurately.
The neutral reportage privilege requires that allegations
made against a defamation plaintiff be reported neutrally and
accurately. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. Globe's allegation
that Mr. Khawar assassinated Senator Kennedy is reported neither
neutrally nor accurately. John Blackburn, the author of the
Globe article, failed to make a good faith attempt to contact
Mr. Khawar and investigate Morrow's charges, thereby publishing
a biased and inaccurate item. Accordingly, Globe fails to meet
the third requirement of the neutral reportage privilege.
1. Globe neglected to follow customary industry
practices to ensure the accuracy of its article.
Kennedy's assassination. (R.T. 2152.) Globe's distribution of
more than two and a half million copies of an article based on
Morrow's discreditable theories cannot be justified. (R.T.
Blackburn did not adhere to the established code of conduct
for journalists. According to the Statement of Principles of
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, "[e]very effort must
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be made to assure that the news content is accurate.” Brown, 48
Cal. 3d at 732 (quoting Swain, Reporter's Ethics (1978) p.ll2). 
In Brown, this Court quoted the Code of Ethics of Sigma Delta 
Chi, The Society of Professional Journalists, and reaffirmed the 
standard that "there is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of 
thoroughness.” Id. Globe's failure to follow industry 
standards should preclude a finding that the article was neutral 
and accurate.
Several expert witnesses testified that Blackburn ignored 
the tenets of professional journalism when writing the Globe 
article. Mr. McSweeney, a veteran of the news business, stated 
that Blackburn's article had little basis to it. (R.T. 795.)
He further testified that the article was "sloppy,”
"unbalanced," "vague about the attribution" and falls below the 
standards of the industry. (R.T. 831.) Mr. McSweeney 
additionally stated that in accordance with respectable industry 
practices, Blackburn should have made a diligent effort to 
interview Mr. Khawar and offer him the opportunity to refute the 
charges. (R.T. 872-75.); see also, Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69. 
Instead, Blackburn accused Mr. Khawar of a serious crime and 
then "[left him] hanging out there to dry." (R.T. 071.) 
Blackburn made only one phone call to Los Angeles Directory 
Assistance, asking for the number of Ali Ahmand. (R.T. 1121- 
22.) Had Blackburn followed conventional journalistic
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practices, he could have found Mr. Khawar by asking for the 
number of Khalid Iqbal, Mr. Khawar's name according to Pakistani 
custom, and the other name Morrow used to identify Mr. Khawar in 
the index of his book. (R.T. 1383; 1122.) Moreover, Blackburn 
could have called the head of the assassination investigation, 
Mr. Houghton, to verify Morrow's allegations. Mr. Houghton, 
however, testified that he never received any investigative 
calls from anyone at Globe. (R.T. 957.)
Even the trial judge found that Globe's article was biased 
and inaccurate. (R.T. 2740.) The trial judge noted that 
although it is impossible to identify Mr. Khawar in the 
photographs in Morrow's book, by retouching, lightening and 
increasing the size of the same photos. Globe created an image 
to finger Mr. Khawar, without cause, as the assassin of Senator 
Kennedy. (R.T. 2742-44.) Thus, Blackburn's failure to follow 
the code of ethics established for all journalists resulted in a 
biased and inaccurate report of Morrow's charges against Mr. 
Khawar. Accordingly, this Court should hold Globe to industry 
practices and find that it failed to produce an neutral and 
accurate article.
2. Republication of a defamatory statement
orioinallv made by another is not a defense to
liability.
This Court should reject Globe's claim that it is not 
liable to Mr. Khawar merely because it republished Morrow's
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conspiracy theories and was not, therefore, the original
publisher of the libelous statements. "American courts have 
traditionally refused to distinguish between publishers and 
republishers of defamatory statements, on the theory that 'tale 
bearers are as bad as tale makers.'" Barry v. Time, Inc.,
584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (quoting McDonald v. 
Glitsch, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)). 
Globe's unverified republication of Morrow's conspiracy theory 
does not immunize Globe from liability for breaching 
constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights. Accordingly, this 
Court should find that Globe cannot shield itself from liability 
merely because it was not the original publisher of the 
defamatory statements.
D. Globe Has Not Satisfied The Final Requirement Of
The Neutral Reportage Privilege That The
Allegations Concern A Public Official Or Public
Figure.
The neutral reportage privilege requires that the 
defamatory allegations be made against a public official or 
public figure. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. Because Mr.
Khawar is a private figure, any assertion of the neutral 
reportage privilege is inappropriate. Accordingly, the court 
below properly held that Globe is precluded from asserting a 
defense of neutral reportage privilege.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the lower court's finding that Mr. 
Khawar is a private figure. His mere association with the 
assassination did not elevate him to public figure status. 
Moreover, Mr. Khawar provided substantial evidence to support 
the jury's finding of actual malice. Thus, this Court should 
affirm the award of punitive damages in Mr. Khawar's favor.
This Court should not adopt the neutral reportage privilege 
because it is inconsistent with constitutional protections for 
defamation plaintiffs. If this Court does adopt the neutral 
reportage privilege, however, this Court should affirm the 
holding of the court below and find that Globe's failure to meet 
the privilege's requirements bars the assertion of the 
privilege.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision 
should be affirmed.
Dated: October 28, 1997 Respectfully Submitted,
Counsel for Respondent 
Mr. Khalid Khawar
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